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Abstract 
This study examines the interaction between Food Stamp Program (FSP) and 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program participation, provides a 
model of joint decisions made by households on FSP, TANF, and labor force 
participation, and explains why households choose different alternatives. 
We use the first Survey of Program Dynamics (SPD) longitudinal data and the 1998 
SPD experimental data files. The modeling component consists of estimating equations to 
predict the probability of particular choices made by households. The households choose 
the alternative that gives the highest utility. The results show that the program parameters 
do matter. Variations across states in payment standards, benefit reduction rates, and 
income disregards help to identify household choices. 
 
Keywords: labor force participation, Food Stamp Program, FSP, TANF, Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families.  
 
  
 
 
 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF JOINT DECISIONS ON FOOD STAMP 
PROGRAM, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES, AND 
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
Introduction 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
of 1996, better known as welfare reform, is set to expire in the fall of 2002. PRWORA 
ended the promise of unlimited cash assistance to the poor. Instead, it gave block grants 
to states, which could then offer poor families temporary subsidies while adults in the 
household prepared to enter the job force. At the center of the welfare reform debate is 
whether the current reforms have been sufficient to move poor families out of poverty, 
into jobs, and into more stable (married) family situations; and whether states, with 
substantial new powers to redesign welfare programs, can accomplish the overall 
program goals. Since 1996, Participation in the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) program has fallen by 56 percent. The 5.4 million persons receiving TANF in 
fiscal year 2001 was the smallest percentage of the population receiving assistance since 
1961 (Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation 2002).  
In the era following welfare reform and the evolution of the TANF program, the 
Food Stamp Program (FSP) has become the largest federal food assistance program for 
low-income households. For many low-income households, food stamps represent an 
important share of household resources. As the unemployed poor become working poor, 
why are so many disappearing from food stamp rolls—even though many are still eligible 
for the federal benefit? From 1994 to 1999, the FSP experienced an unprecedented 
decline in participation. Participation fell from 27.5 million people in 1994 to 17.2 
million people in 2000 (USDA 2002). The strong economy and changes in social welfare 
programs have accounted for a part of the decline. But while the declining caseloads 
mean fewer people are receiving assistance, they tell us nothing about the circumstances 
of the families that leave and whether they are making a successful transition off welfare. 
The new 2002 farm legislation reauthorizes the FSP for five years and reinstates food 
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stamp eligibility for legal immigrants residing in the United States for at least five years, 
and for all immigrant children and disabled individuals.  
The changes in the linkages among social assistance programs under welfare reform 
are likely to have significant effects on the behavior of low-income individuals and 
families. The overall purpose of this study is to examine the economic and welfare 
program factors affecting the well-being of low-income families and the effects of 
welfare reform on labor supply decisions. 
Most of the previous studies on FSP participation have examined the determinants of 
participation in the FSP among low-income or FSP-eligible households (see Gleason, 
Schochet, and Moffitt 1998 and Currie 2000 for a literature review). Currie (2000) 
focuses on evidence of how the FSP and other federal nutrition programs have met the 
goals of the federal food and nutrition programs. Because of common program eligibility 
rules for TANF and the FSP, joint participation parameters are of interest. Fraker and 
Moffitt (1988) model the effect of joint participation in the FSP and the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program on labor supply. As they show, the budget 
constraint for individuals on both the FSP and AFDC programs is complex and includes 
many kinks. Fraker and Moffitt estimate that in 1980, the FSP reduced labor supply of 
female heads of families by about 9 percent and the AFDC program had only a slightly 
greater effect on labor supply. Marginal changes in benefit levels and the benefit 
reduction rates had small effects on labor market participation. Hagstrom (1996) uses 
data from the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to model the 
effect of food stamp participation on the family labor supply of married couples and finds 
that the FSP has a weak effect on the labor supply of married couples. Decreasing the 
FSP benefit by 25 percent would reduce the proportion of husbands and wives who 
choose not to work by less than 1 percent, while increasing the food stamp benefit by 25 
percent would raise the FSP participation by 7 percent. Keane and Moffitt (1998) 
estimate that a reduction of the AFDC tax rate would have scarcely any effect on labor 
supply and would increase the participation rate in both AFDC and food stamps. Hoynes 
(1996) models the effects of cash transfers on labor supply and welfare participation in 
two-parent families. She shows that labor supply and welfare participation are highly 
responsive to changes in the benefit structure under the AFDC–Unemployed Parent 
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program. In sum, the effects of program parameters and labor market variables are likely 
to be complex, and evidence is still not clear-cut on their relative importance. 
Among studies that have examined the effects of the 1996 reform on post-1996 
caseloads are the Council of Economic Advisers (1999), and Schoeni and Blank (2000). 
Studies by Zedlewski and Braumer (1999) and Wilde et al. (2000) document that many 
families that left welfare also left the FSP even though they were still eligible for food 
stamps. Ohls (2001) suggests that families leaving TANF because of employment or 
other reasons might not be told that they are still eligible to receive food stamps, or 
families who enter the TANF program may not receive the information that they 
automatically are eligible for food stamp assistance. Moffitt (2002) gives an extensive 
review of the rules of the TANF program and the research that has been conducted on 
AFDC and TANF to date. He points out that while there is strong evidence that the 
TANF program has increased employment and earnings and decreased caseloads, the 
separate effects of work requirements, time limits, sanctions, and other features are 
unknown. 
The fundamental motivation for this study is the question of interactions among FSP, 
TANF program, and labor force participation under different program designs and 
economic conditions. A goal of this study is to provide in-depth analyses of current 
circumstances of individuals and households that participate in the FSP and TANF and to 
make comparisons to those who left or who do not participate in welfare programs even 
though they are eligible. The study also examines the effects of key welfare program 
parameters such as benefit levels, welfare tax (the benefit reduction rate), income 
disregard, and sanctions for non-compliance with work requirements. 
The objective of this study is to provide a model of the joint decisions by households 
to participate in the FSP, the TANF program, and/or to work. In this paper we show that 
the variations across states in payment standards, benefit reduction rates, and income 
disregards help to identify household choices. The results show that the program 
parameters do matter. Participation in TANF is positively related to the probability of 
FSP participation and negatively related to being in the work force. Working decreases 
the probability of receiving food stamps. Work, TANF, and FSP participation are 
significantly related. This paper includes seven sections: (1) FSP and TANF eligibility 
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criteria and benefits; (2) the theoretical model; (3) empirical model and estimation; (4) 
data and variables; (5) results; (6) policy simulations; and (7) conclusions. 
 
Food Stamp and Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families Programs: Eligibility and Benefits 
The FSP established uniform national eligibility standards. Households who qualify 
for this program must be income and asset poor. That is, the gross income of a household 
must be at or below 130 percent of the poverty line and net income must be less than 100 
percent of the poverty line. However, states have some discretion within federal rules. 
States may exclude certain types of income and resources not counted under other 
welfare programs and they are given new options on the use of standardized deductions. 
A household must also have assets worth less than $2,000 ($3,000 for households with 
someone 60 years of age or over). The maximum amount of food stamps a household can 
receive depends on the household size. Benefits also vary with income. For those who 
meet the eligibility criteria, the food stamp benefit is equal to the maximum benefit (Gh) 
given the household size minus 30 percent of the household’s net income. 
The PRWORA gives each state a fundamental role in assisting poor families, and, 
under TANF, each state has different eligibility rules and benefits. Eligible TANF 
families, however, must have sufficiently low income and asset levels. The income test 
requires that net family income not exceed a maximum benefit level that varies by family 
size and state of residence. Net income includes unearned income as well as countable 
earned income (earned income less an earned income disregard). A family having no 
income is eligible to receive the maximum permitted TANF grant in the state (BTsh). For 
a family with income, the TANF benefits are calculated as the difference between the 
maximum potential benefit or “pay standard” ( BˆTsh), and net-family income: 
 BTsh = min{BTsh, [ BˆTsh - Nh – ts(whHh - Es)]},                 (1) 
where Nh is the household unearned income, Es is a state earned income disregard (a 
dollar amount of earned income not counted when calculating the amount of welfare cash 
transfer), ts is the benefit reduction rate, which is applied to earnings that exceed the 
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income disregard, and is between 0 and 1. The size of the welfare grant falls as earned 
income rises, but not dollar for dollar. This maintains incentives for eligible household 
members to work and not just rely on transfers. 
Under PRWORA, welfare responsibility is left to state-run TANF programs. 
However, the act did include some strong rules. Recipients are now required to work, and 
most can collect aid for no more than five years over a lifetime. TANF recipients must 
secure a job after two continuous years on assistance. In 1997, at least 25 percent of 
single-parent-headed households and 75 percent of two-parent households were engaged 
in work activities in each state. Single parents receiving TANF benefits were required to 
work at least 20 hours per week by 1997 and at least 30 hours per week by 2000. Two-
parent families must work 35 hours per week with the stipulation that parents can share 
the work hours. The required work activities include specified “priority” activities: 
employment, on-the-job training, job search and job readiness, community service, 
vocational educational training, or provision of childcare in community service. This 
requirement tends to force families into the workplace and off welfare. If adults who are 
required to participate in activities do not comply with requirements, the state has the 
option to sanction or reduce the unit’s benefit. A sanction generally results in the removal 
of the non-complying individual from the unit for benefit computation purposes, a 
percentage reduction in the entire unit’s benefit, or a full benefit sanction. States increase 
the severity of the sanction based on the amount of time or the number of times the 
individual is non-compliant. States may not use TANF funds to assist a family that 
includes an adult who has received assistance for more than five years, and the state may 
set a time limit of less than five years. The state is allowed to exempt up to 20 percent of 
its caseload for reasons such as no job availability or a high unemployment rate, age of 
parent, and disability or illness.1 Families eligible for TANF are automatically eligible for 
Food Stamp and Medicaid programs. 
 
Theoretical Model 
A static model of household behavior is developed where work and program 
participation are chosen to maximize household utility function subject to a budget 
constraint reflecting transfers. The model is used to explain the joint decisions to 
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participate in TANF, the FSP, and labor markets of a population of households eligible 
for those programs. The household head chooses whether to work or not and 
simultaneously decides whether to participate in TANF or the FSP. The FSP and TANF 
participation and labor supply decisions are interdependent because labor supply 
decisions depend on the FSP and TANF benefits (through their effect on the budget 
constraint), the TANF participation decision depends on labor supply (through its effect 
on the TANF benefits), and the FSP participation decision depends on labor supply and 
TANF participation (through their effect on the food stamp benefits—each payment is 
reduced by an extra dollar of earnings and extra dollar of TANF benefit). Therefore, the 
combination of program participation choices must be treated jointly with the labor 
supply choice, and the labor supply equation must be estimated jointly with the TANF 
and FSP participation equations. 
Following Moffitt (1983), consider the following family utility function: 
 U (L, X, Pt, Pf) = U (L, X) + dtPt + dfPf (2) 
where L is the household head leisure, X is purchased goods, Pt is an indicator equal to 1 
if the family participates in TANF and 0 if not, Pf is equal to 1 if the family participates in 
the FSP and 0 if not, dt is the marginal disutility of TANF participation, and df is the 
marginal disutility of FSP participation (dt and df represent tastes for receiving cash 
transfers and food stamps respectively). The program participation indicators in equation 
(2) represent the costs of participating in the welfare program and are included to explain 
and account for non-participation among eligible families. If stigma is associated with 
program participation (and if Pt and Pf capture nothing besides stigma), dt < 0 and df < 0. 
Hence, we would expect that ¶U/¶L > 0, ¶U/¶X > 0, ¶U/¶Pt < 0, and ¶U/¶Pf < 0. The 
budget constraint gives monthly disposable income: 
 I = wH + N + Pt(Bt(H)-Ct) + Pf(Bf(H)-Cf) = PxX, (3) 
 
where w is the hourly wage rate per work hour, Bt(H) and Bf(H) are the benefit functions 
for TANF and the FSP respectively, Ct and Cf are the monetary costs associated with 
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TANF and FSP participation respectively, and H is the household head labor supply. Full 
income is 
 w(! - L) + N + Pt(B(H)-C) + Pf(Bf(H)-Cf) - PxX = 0,  (4) 
or 
 F = w! + N + Pt(B(H)-C) + Pf(Bf(H)-Cf) = PxX + wL, 
where !(=L+H) is the household head time endowment. 
The household head is assumed to choose H (or L), Pt, and Pf simultaneously to 
maximize its utility U (L, X, Pt, Pf) subject to the budget constraint in equation (3). The 
household head chooses the (H, Pt, Pf) combination that provides the highest indirect 
utility. 
The optimal choices are 
 X*= dX[w, Px, N, Bt¢(H), Bf¢(H), Ct, Cf, Z], (5) 
 L*= dL[w, Px, N, Bt¢(H), Bf¢(H), Ct, Cf, Z], (6) 
 H*= ! - L*= SH[w, Px, N, Bt¢(H), Bf¢(H), Ct, Cf, Z], (7) 
 Pt*= dPt[w, Px, N, Bt¢(H), Bf¢(H), Ct, Cf, Z], (8) 
 Pf*= dPf[w, Px, N, Bt¢(H), Bf¢(H), Ct, Cf, Z]. (9) 
where Z is a vector of other explanatory variables. Given these equations, we have also 
the following wage equation: w*=w[H, Z]. 
Participation in welfare programs is not costless. Costs are associated with a family 
filing an application, going for an interview, as well as with the opportunity cost from 
reduced expected future benefits due to a lifetime time limit imposed in TANF, and with 
opportunity costs of foregone labor earnings to become eligible. In addition, as Moffitt 
(1983) suggests, stigma is associated with AFDC participation and this helps explain the 
observed lower-than-expected participation rates. Families facing relatively low costs of 
current period participation are more likely to participate than are those facing higher 
costs. Ohls (2001) suggests that households might not participate in the FSP because of 
lack of transportation or potential embarrassment of receiving food stamps, or because 
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the application process is too burdensome. Zedlewski (2001) show that more families 
reported leaving the FSP because of administrative issues in 1999 than in 1997. Given 
states’ freedom in designing TANF programs, important and hard-to-measure differences 
exist among states that may affect labor supply and TANF decisions. For example, the 
way in which a state TANF bureaucracy encourages or discourages participation in the 
TANF program is likely to affect stigma and transaction costs of participating and 
therefore account for some of the cross-state differences in participation. However, this is 
difficult to measure. While the costs and stigma associated with claiming benefits may be 
important, the empirical analysis cannot directly address these issues but they can be 
explicitly defined in a particular error term. 
 
Empirical Specification and Estimation 
The econometric model is a four-equation structural model that allows us to examine 
feedback among endogenous variables. The dependent variables in the model are labor 
force participation (Pl), TANF participation (Pt), FSP participation (Pf), and wage. The 
first three dependent variables are binary variables, and wage is continuous. The 
structural form of the three limited dependent variables is 
Pl** = altPt* + alfPf* + bl¢Zl + µl with Pl = 1 if Pl** > 0, and 0 otherwise; 
Pt** = atlPl* + atfPf* + bt¢Zt + µt with Pt = 1 if Pt** > 0 and 0 otherwise; 
Pf** = aflPl* + aftPt* + bf¢Zf + µf with Pf = 1 if Pf** > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
Although Pl**, Pt**, and Pf** are unobservable, we do observe Pl, Pt, and Pf. Define Z 
as a vector of all observed exogenous variables, and Zl c Z, Zt c Z, Zf c Z, and Zl g Zt g 
Zf, alt, alf, bl¢, atl, atf, bt¢, afl, aft, bf¢ as parameter vectors, and define µl, µt, and µf as 
disturbance terms. Solving for the reduced form, we obtain 
Pl*= pl¢Z +nl, Pl = 1 if Pl* > 0, and 0 otherwise; 
Pt*= pt¢Z+nt, Pt = 1 if Pt* > 0, and 0 otherwise; 
Pf*= pf¢Z+nf, Pf = 1 if Pf* > 0, and 0 otherwise. 
The potential simultaneity of employment and the decision to participate in TANF and 
the FSP is taken into account by using a simultaneous equation framework. 
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We use two-stage estimation procedure (Nelson and Olson 1978). First, we estimate 
the reduced form or estimate pl, pt, and pf by maximum-likelihood applied to each 
equation. Second, we form the instruments ZP ll
'* ˆˆ p= , ZP tt
'* ˆˆ p= , and ZP ff
'* ˆˆ p= . Third, we 
replace Pl*, Pt*, and Pf* on the right-hand side of the structural equations by the 
corresponding Zl
'pˆ , Zt
'pˆ , Zf
'pˆ  and treat these instruments as fixed regressors and the 
resulting equations as single-equation models. We then estimate the structural parameters 
by maximum likelihood applied to each equation separately. In the independent probit 
model, we also include variables we use for identification in the simultaneous equation 
models. At least one variable in the vector Zl cannot be in Zt and Zf, and vice versa. For 
the vector Zl, we use children under age 6, children under age 13, and children under age 
18 as variables for identification; for vector Zt we use the TANF program parameters 
(pay standard, benefit reduction rate, income disregard, and sanction), and for vector Zf 
we use age and age squared, and the FSP benefit. 
The empirical specification of the individual human-capital-based wage equation is 
ln(wage) = ß0 + ß1age+ß2agesq+ß3edu+ß4male+ß5O¢+mw, 
where O¢ is a vector of exogenous variables including race (white=1), marital status 
(married=1), and labor market variables (state unemployment rate); and whether the 
household head is male (male=1); variable mw is a normal random error term. The wage 
equation also includes a labor-market selection variable. 
 
Data and Variables 
We use the U.S. Census Bureau’s first Survey of Program Dynamics (SPD) 
longitudinal data and the 1998 SPD experimental data files for the empirical analysis. 
The SPD contains detailed information about the characteristics of and the choices made 
by participant and non-participant households. The SPD survey is comprised of two SIPP 
files, the SPD Bridge file and the SPD file. The SIPP files are 1992 and 1993 SIPP Panel 
data and they are recoded to look and feel much like the Census Bureau’s March Current 
Population Survey (CPS) files. The SPD Bridge file is a CPS instrument administered on 
the SPD population. The SPD file collects data on assets and many other important 
variables. Available longitudinal data are restricted to the variables on the March CPS. 
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As a result, the SPD longitudinal file has core employment, earnings, income, health 
insurance, and Medicaid information but lacks other data, such as assets that were left off 
the file. Therefore, the 1998 SPD experimental file is merged into the SPD longitudinal 
file. The 1998 Experimental Data were minimally edited, and imputations were not 
performed for missing data. 
The longitudinal SPD file provides information on income, job participation, 
program participation, health insurance and utilization, and the well-being of adults and 
children during the reference period (1997).  
The demographic variables for each member of the household include age, sex, 
education level, race, marital status, and household relationship. The economic 
characteristics include work experience, non-labor income, and an indicator (0, 1) of not 
receiving any cash benefits. The work experience information covers employment status, 
weeks worked, whether heads of household are looking for work or on layoff, average 
hours employed per week, and other job-specific characteristics. It also contains detailed 
information on variables that are necessary to determine the eligibility and the benefits 
for welfare programs, such as age, disability status of household members, and data on 
income, labor force status, and household’s participation in government-sponsored 
programs such as TANF, Food Stamps, and Medicaid. The data about state TANF 
parameters is collected from the Green Book (U.S. House of Representatives 1998) and 
Gallagher et al. (1998). Information about unemployment rates is from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (1999).  
Only non-elderly (between ages 18 and 65), non-disabled household heads are 
included in the sample (both the elderly and the disabled are eligible for other transfer 
programs). Households are also excluded from the sample if they are categorically 
ineligible for the TANF program, that is, if they do not have a child under age 18 in the 
family. Households with assets that exceed the state asset limit are excluded from the 
sample (Table 1). The resulting sample includes 4,545 households with low wealth, 66 
percent of which are married-couple families, and 57 percent of which have a male as a 
household head (weighted data). The household head is the person (or one of the persons) 
in whose name the housing unit is owned or rented. If the house is owned or rented 
jointly by a married couple, the household head may be either the husband or the wife.  
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TABLE 1. State TANF parameters and unemployment rates 
State Asset Limit ($) B ($) E ($) t (%) 
Sanction 
(months) UNRATE (%) 
Alabama 2,000 137 0 80 6 5.1 
Alaska 1,000 821 150 67 Until compliance 7.5 
Arizona 2,000 275 90 70 6 4.6 
Arkansas 3,000 162 0 100 3 5.3 
California 2,000 493 225 50 6 6.3 
Colorado 2,000 280 120 67 3 3.3 
Connecticut 3,000 443 1157 100 3 5.1 
Delaware 1,000 270 120 67 Lifetime 4.0 
D.C. 1,000 298 100 50 6 7.9 
Florida 2,000 241 200 50 3 4.8 
Georgia 1,000 235 120 67 Lifetime 4.5 
Hawaii 5,000 452 200 44 6 6.4 
Idaho 2,000 276 0 100 Until compliance 5.0 
Illinois 3,000 278 0 33 6 4.7 
Indiana 1,500 229 120 67 36 3.5 
Iowa 5,000 361 0 40 6 3.3 
Kansas 2,000 352 90 60 2 3.8 
Kentucky 2,000 225 120 67 Until compliance 5.4 
Louisiana 2,000 138 1020 100 6 6.1 
Maine 2,000 312 108 50 6 5.4 
Maryland 2,000 313 0 65 1 5.1 
Massachusetts 2,500 474 120 50 0.5 4.0 
Michigan 3,000 371 200 80 1 4.2 
Minnesota 5,000 437 0 64 6 3.3 
Mississippi 1,000 96 90 100 Lifetime 5.7 
Missouri 5,000 234 120 67 6 4.2 
Montana 3,000 366 200 75 6 5.4 
Nebraska 6,000 293 0 80 6 2.6 
Nevada 2,000 289 0 50 1 4.1 
New Hampshire 2,000 481 0 50 1 3.1 
New Jersey 2,000 322 0 50 3 5.1 
New Mexico 1,500 410 150 50 1 6.2 
New York 2,000 467 90 55 6 6.4 
North Carolina 3,000 236 120 67 6 3.6 
North Dakota 5,000 340 0 62 Until compliance 2.7 
Ohio 1,000 279 250 50 6 4.6 
Oklahoma 1,000 225 120 50 Until compliance 4.1 
Oregon 2,500 427 0 50 Until compliance 5.8 
Pennsylvania 1,000 316 0 50 Lifetime 5.2 
Rhode Island 1,000 449 170 50 0.5 5.3 
South Carolina 2,500 160 0 50 1 4.5 
South Dakota 2,000 380 90 80 6 2.7 
Tennessee 2,000 142 150 100 3 5.4 
Texas 2,000 163 120 67 6 5.4 
Utah 2,000 362 100 50 Until compliance 3.1 
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TABLE 1. Continued 
State Asset Limit ($) B ($) E ($) t (%) 
Sanction 
(months) UNRATE (%) 
Vermont 1,000 554 150 75 Until compliance 4.5 
Virginia 1,000 231 120 67 6 4.0 
Washington 1,000 440 0 50 6 4.8 
West Virginia 2,000 201 0 60 6 6.9 
Wisconsin 2,500 440 120 67 Must reapply 3.7 
Wyoming 2,500 320 200 100 1 4.6 
Sources: TANF Parameters: Green Book (1998); Gallagher et al. (1998); Asset limits are for 1997 recipients; B (the 
maximum benefit) is for three-member family; Unemployment rates: U.S. Census Bureau (1999). 
 
When modeling program participation choice, the issue of controlling for eligibility 
arises. This is not a simple matter because the eligibility criteria differ across states and 
the income is endogenous. We include all households who pass the TANF asset test 
rather than sampling on income, which is endogenous. 
The variables we use in our analysis are a set of demographic variables, a set of 
household composition variables, and a set of structural variables designed to capture 
differences in labor market conditions and transfer programs. The demographic variables 
for the household head include his or her age, education level, a dichotomous variable 
indicating race (white=1), and non-labor income, which includes all non-wage family 
income excluding income from welfare transfers. The set of household composition 
variables includes the number of children under age 6, the number of children between 
ages 6 and 13, and the number of children between ages 13 and 18. The set of individual 
characteristics includes UNEMPLR, the state’s annual unemployment rate. Also relevant 
are the observations of actual household earned and unearned income, program 
participation choices, and assets. As shown in equation (1) the benefit from participating 
in TANF is either the maximum permitted state benefit, BTsh, or the pay standard, BˆTsh, 
net of earned and unearned income according to state-specific reduction and disregard 
rates, whichever is lower. The food stamp benefits are equal to the maximum FSP grant 
net of the 30 percent countable income. Since earned income is endogenous to the choice 
to work, we instrument the payoffs of participating in TANF by the pay standard BˆTsh 
and the FSP by the maximum food stamps Gh for the specific household. 
A household is recorded as a TANF participant household if a household member 
reports receiving TANF support during the reference year 1997. A household is recorded 
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as an FSP participant household if a household member reports receiving food stamps 
during the reference year. Household heads are classified as not working if they report 
working zero hours during the reference period, and they are classified as working if they 
report working one or more hours per week during the reference period. Table 2 presents 
the means and standard errors of the sample (weighted) percentage data. Table 3 shows 
the distribution of the sample by labor and welfare participation for all household heads 
and for single and married household heads. Over 30 percent of the single households 
participate in the FSP and TANF while only 6 percent of the married households 
participate in these programs. Married household heads work more (93 percent) than do 
the single ones (86 percent). 
The household heads are classified into eight groups: (i) working, FSP and TANF 
participant; (ii) not working, FSP and TANF participant; (iii) working, not FSP 
participant, TANF participant; (iv) working, FSP participant, not TANF participant; (v) 
not working, not FSP participant, TANF participant; (vi) not working, FSP participant, 
not TANF participant; (vii) working, FSP participant, not TANF participant; and (viii) not 
working, not FSP participant, not TANF participant. Table 4 summarizes the main 
descriptive characteristics of these groups. The first row of the table gives the 
demographic characteristics of the whole sample. Those who work and are non-
participants in the FSP and TANF (group 7) are more likely to be male, married, white, to 
have more education, and to have less children. The TANF and FSP participants who do 
not work (group 2) are less likely to be married and more likely to have more children. 
TANF-only participants (group 5) are most likely to be female and have the least 
education and the smallest amount of non-labor income. 
Table 5 compares the main demographic characteristics of welfare participants with 
those of non-participants. The welfare participants are most likely to be single, younger, 
and have more children, have less non-labor income, and have less education. They are 
also less likely to work compared to the non-participants. 
Table 6 presents the duration of participation in the FSP and TANF in 1997. The 
average number of months in TANF for TANF-only participants is 9.68, while for 
participants in both TANF and the FSP the number of months is slightly higher—10.15.  
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TABLE 2. Definitions of variables, means, and standard errors (n = 4,545; weighted 
data) 
Variable 
Mean  
(Standard Error) Definition 
Age 37.24 (0.15) Age of household head  
Agesq 1,462.9 (11.52) Age squared  
Schooling 12.24 (0.037) Years of schooling of household head  
Male 0.57 (0.008) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the household head is a 
male, and 0 otherwise  
Married 0.66 (0.008) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the household head is 
married, and 0 otherwise 
White 0.79 (0.008) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household head is white, 
and 0 otherwise 
Kids6 0.65 (0.013) 
Number of children in household who are younger than 6 
years old in household  
Kids13 0.84 (0.015) 
Number of children in household who are 6 and younger than 
13 years old in household 
Kids18 0.51 (0.012) 
Number of children in household who are 13 and younger 
than 18 years old in household 
Northeast 0.17 (0.006) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household lives in the 
Northeast region, and 0 otherwise 
Midwest 0.24 (0.007) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household lives in the 
Midwest region, and 0 otherwise 
South 0.39 (0.009) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household lives in the 
South region, and 0 otherwise 
UNRATE 4.93 (0.017) Annual state unemployment rate 
Non-labor income 1,508 (92.09) 
Household non-labor income exclusive of welfare transfers 
per year in $ 
Pay standard 455.03 (3.34) Maximum TANF grant per month in $, given participation 
ts 
The benefit reduction rate is the rate at which additional 
dollars of earned income reduce the TANF benefit 
Es 
0.62 (0.003) 
 
 
140.55 (3.27) 
The income disregard is a dollar amount of earned income not 
counted when calculating the household’s transfer 
G 403.42 (1.81) Maximum FSP grant per month in $, given participation 
Ln(wage) 2.37 (0.017) Natural log of hourly wage  
ˆln( )wage  2.41 (0.005) Predicted value of natural log of hourly wage 
LF participation  0.90 (0.005) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household head works, 
and 0 otherwise 
TANF 
participation  0.09 (0.005) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household participates in 
TANF, and 0 otherwise 
FSP participation 0.13 (0.006) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household participates in 
FSP, and 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 3. Distribution of the sample by labor force and welfare participation, and by 
family type 
 Working Not working All 
All Household Heads 
Not participate in TANF and FSP 3,638 80 % 244  5.4 % 3,882  85 % 
Participate in TANF but not in FSP  59  1.3 %  12  0.3 %   71    2 % 
Participate in FSP but not in TANF 224  4.9 %  48  1.1 %   272    6 % 
Participate in TANF and FSP 193  4.2 % 128  2.8 %   321    7 % 
All 4,113 90.5 % 432 19.5 % 4,545 100% 
Single Household Heads 
Not participate in TANF and FSP 966 64.0 %  71  4.7 % 1,037 68.7 % 
Participate in TANF but not in FSP  38  2.5 %   8  0.5 %    46   3.0 % 
Participate in FSP but not in TANF 139  9.2 %  33  2.2 %   172 11.4 % 
Participate in TANF and FSP 150  9.9 % 104  6.9 %   254 16.8 % 
All 1,293 85.7 % 216 14.3 % 1,509 100% 
Married Household Heads 
Not participate in TANF and FSP 2,672 88.0 % 173 5.7 % 2,845 93.7 % 
Participate in TANF but not in FSP    21  0.7 %    4 0.1 %     25   0.8 % 
Participate in FSP but not in TANF    85  2.8 %   15 0.5 %    100   3.3 % 
Participate in TANF and FSP    42  1.4 %   24 0.8 %     66   2.2 % 
All 2,820 92.9 % 216 7.1 % 3,036 100% 
Source: 1st longitudinal SPD data. 
 
 
TABLE 4. Main demographic characteristics of different household groups 
(weighted data) 
 
No. of 
Households 
Unweighted Male Married Educ White Kids Age 
Nonlab 
Income 
Sample 4545 0.57 0.66 12.24 0.79 1.999 37.24 1,508 
Pt=Pf=Pl=1 192 0.19 0.18 11.33 0.56 2.45 33.88 2,169 
Pt=0, Pf=Pl=1 224 0.32 0.32 11.46 0.62 2.22 34.08 971 
Pt=Pf=1, Pl=0 128 0.08 0.13 10.57 0.52 2.82 34.81 582 
Pt=Pl=1, Pf=0 59 0.28 0.33 11.8 0.61 2.02 37.92 1,475 
Pt=1, Pf=Pl=0 12 0.15 0.24 9.69 0.59 2.16 39.42 703 
Pt=Pl=0, Pf=1 48 0.16 0.28 10.94 0.71 2.12 34.42 1,204 
Pt=Pf=Pl=0 244 0.25 0.72 11.85 0.82 2.2 36.92 2,371 
Pt=Pf=0, Pl=1 3638 0.65 0.73 12.46 0.83 1.91 37.76 1,494 
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TABLE 5. Main demographic characteristics of welfare participants and  
non-participants (weighted data) 
 
% of 
House-
holds 
Un-
weighted Male Married Educ White Kids Age 
Nonlab 
Income 
FSP 
partic 
TANF
partic 
Labor 
partic 
Welfare 
participants 0.15 0.21 0.24 11.2 0.59 2.39 34.6 1,283 0.9 0.6 0.71 
Non- 
participants 0.85 0.63 0.73 12.4 0.83 1.93 37.7 1,547   0.94 
 
 
 
TABLE 6. Participation in TANF and the FSP 
 
Only TANF 
participants Only FSP participants 
TANF and FSP 
participants 
Number of months in 
TANF 
 
9.68  
 
10.15 
Number of months in FSP  9.14 10.81 
Number of households 71 272 320 
 
 
The number of months in the FSP is 9.14 for FSP-only participants and it is 10.81 for 
participants in both TANF and the FSP. 
 
Empirical Results 
The dependent variables of the empirical model are TANF, FSP, labor force 
participation, and ln hourly wage. The simultaneous equation model is estimated using 
the instrumental variable estimator proposed by Nelson and Olson (1978). 
At the first stage, each endogenous variable is regressed on a set of instrumental 
variables. The instruments consist of all exogenous variables in the model. The predicted 
values for the limited dependent variables are the predicted values Zl
'pˆ , Zt
'pˆ , Zf
'pˆ , rather 
than the predicted probability. The second stage is to substitute for the endogenous 
variables on the right-hand side of the system using the predicted values and then 
estimate the system by probit (TANF, FSP, labor force participation) and least squares 
(wage equation). 
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Wage Equation 
Two sets of estimates for the wage equation are reported in Table 7, one with a 
selection term and one without a selection term. The wage equation is concave in age, 
and the age effect peaks at age 51. The findings on other coefficients are consistent with 
other studies. One additional year of schooling has the direct effect of increasing the 
wage by 7.6 percent. Added schooling increases wage income through increased labor 
productivity, holding other factors equal. Being male or white also increases an 
individual’s wage. The hypothesis of the joint test of all the non-intercept coefficients, 
except for the coefficient of the selection term, is rejected. The sample value is 28.36 (the 
critical value is 2.01). The R2 is 12 percent. We estimated a wage equation for the 
household heads who work and then used the predicted wage in the labor force 
participation equation in place of the actual wage, as an instrumental variable. 
TANF Participation 
The structural estimates of the TANF program participation are presented in Table 8. 
All coefficients have the hypothesized signs and many are highly significant. With 
respect to the state welfare policy instruments, the effects are as follows: 
1. The higher are the benefits (pay standard), the higher is the TANF participation. 
2. TANF participation is positively related to the earned income disregard and 
negatively related to the benefit reduction rate, and the effects are highly signifi-
cant. 
3. The higher is the sanction, the less likely is the household to participate in 
TANF, but the effect is not statistically different from zero. 
Being male and married decreases the probability of being in TANF. Participation in 
TANF is positively related to the probability of FSP participation and negatively related 
to being in the work force. The higher non-labor income a household has, the smaller is 
the probability of that household’s TANF participation.2 
FSP Participation 
The structural estimates of the TANF program participation are presented in Table 9. 
Being a TANF participant increases the probability of FSP participation. Working 
decreases the probability of receiving food stamps. Both effects are statistically  
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TABLE 7. Estimates of the individual log wage equation 
Explanatory Variables ln(wage) ln(wage) 
Intercept -0.119 (0.288) -0.529 (0.226)*** 
Age 0.062 (0.012)*** 0.075(0.011)*** 
Agesq -0.0006 (0.00002)*** -0.0008(0.00001)*** 
Schooling 0.076 (0.008)*** 0.085(0.007)*** 
Married 0.107 (0.040)*** 0.078(0.038)**i   
Male 0.214 (0.059)*** 0.323(0.036)*** 
White 0.094 (0.038)*** 0.106 (0.038)**i   
UNRATE 0.002 (0.016) -0.014 (0.014)ii 
Lambda -0.417 (0.181)* i i 
 
R-square 
 
 0.123 
 
 0.122 
F Statistics  65.17  73.63 
Number of observations  3,710  3,710 
Note: ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
TABLE 8. Structural estimates of the TANF program participation (probability of 
TANF participation) 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable 
Intercept -0.168 (0.243) 
Predicted FSP participationa 0.616 (0.090)*** 
Predicted labor force participationb -0.315 (0.116)** 
Male -0.277 (0.180) 
Married -0.527 (0.155)*** 
Pay standard 0.0008(0.00002)*** 
ts -0.582 (0.245)
** 
Es 0.0005(0.0002)
*** 
Sanction -0.009 (0.035) 
Nlabinc -2.32E-6(6.55E-6) 
Male*Married 0.478 (0.209)**i 
  
Log Likelihood  -968.03 
Number of observations  4,545 
Note: ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
aPredicted FSP participation is the predicted value of participating in the FSP. 
bPredicted labor force participation is the predicted value of participating in the labor market. 
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TABLE 9. Structural Estimates of the FSP program participation (Probability of FSP 
participation) 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable 
Intercept 0.329 (0.347) 
Predicted TANF participationa 0.254 (0.098)** 
Predicted labor force participationb -0.735 (0.130)*** 
Male 0.098 (0.139) 
Married -1.062 (0.163)*** 
G 0.0007 (0.0003)** 
Nlabinc -0.00001(6E-6)** 
Male*Married 0.631 (0.157)*** 
  
Log Likelihood  -1,335.19 
Number of observations  4,545 
Note: **   Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
aPredicted TANF participation is the predicted value of participating in TANF program. 
bPredicted labor force participation is the predicted value of participating in the labor market. 
 
 
significant. The higher is the food stamp benefit, the higher is the probability of a 
household being in the FSP. Being married decreases the probability of being in TANF. 
Having higher non-labor income makes the household less likely to participate in the 
FSP, and the effect is significant. 
Labor Force Participation 
The structural estimates of the TANF program participation are presented in Table 
10. Variables that are excluded from the labor force participation equation are pay 
standard, benefit reduction rate, income disregard, sanction, and FSP benefit variables. 
The education, race, age, and age squared of the household head variables are excluded 
from the labor force participation equation in particular to identify the wage effect in 
labor force participation. 
Working is positively related to a higher (predicted) wage and being male. The 
choice not to work is explained by having more children. Participation in the TANF 
program decreases the probability of working. Working decreases the probability of 
being a TANF and/or an FSP participant. Therefore, work, TANF, and FSP participation 
are correlated and highly significant. Higher unemployment rates decrease the probability 
of labor force participation. 
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TABLE 10. Structural estimates of the labor force participation (probability of labor 
force participation) 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable 
Intercept -0.487 (0.472) 
Predicted TANF participationa -0.309 (0.105)*** 
Predicted FSP participationb 0.315 (0.186) 
Male 0.444 (0.188)** 
Married -0.344 (0.199) 
Kids6 -0.191 (0.077)** 
Kids13 -0.169 (0.060)*** 
Kids18 -0.087 (0.050) 
)ˆln( geaw  1.140 (0.329)*** 
UNRATE -0.147 (0.039)*** 
Nlabinc -2.44E-6 (4.8E-6)** 
Male*Married 0.369 (0.217) 
  
Log Likelihood  -1,181.67 
Number of observations  4,545 
Note: ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
aPredicted TANF participation is the predicted value of participating in TANF program. 
bPredicted FSP participation is the predicted value of participating in FSP. 
 
 
Policy Simulations 
In this section, we present the simulated effects of changes in policy parameters and 
wage on labor force and program participation. We evaluate an increase in payment 
standards, a decrease in the benefit reduction rate, and an increase in income disregard on 
the probability of TANF, FSP, and labor participation. We also examine the effect of an 
increase in the (predicted) wage on the probability of labor participation. The simulations 
are constructed by using the model estimates to predict the probabilities of TANF, FSP, 
and labor force participation given the household variables (demographic characteristics, 
non-labor income, welfare program parameters). Predicting the probabilities for each 
observation and then taking the mean over all observations creates average probabilities. 
Changing the program parameters and wage allows us to compare the probabilities of 
TANF, FSP, and labor force participation with those experienced under the current law. 
The baseline estimates are displayed in the first column of Table 11. The predicted 
TANF participation rate is 8.6 percent, FSP, 13 percent, and labor force, 90.5 percent.  
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TABLE 11. Simulated changes in program parameters and wage (absolute and 
percentage changes in parentheses) 
 Base 
25% Increase 
in Pay 
Standard 
$100 Increase in 
Income Disregard 
10% Increase 
in BRR 
10% Increase in 
(Predicted) 
Wage 
Probability of 
TANF 
participation 0.0859 
0.0932 
(0.0073, 9%) 
0.0884 
(0.0025, 3%) 
0.0819 
(-0.0040, -5%)  
 
Probability of 
FSP 
participation 
 
0.1302 
 
0.1412 
(0.0110, 8%) 
 
0.1289 
(-0.0012,-1%) 
 
0.1284 
(-0.0018, -1%)  
 
Probability of 
labor force 
participation 
 
0.9050 
 
0.8961 
(-0.0089, -1%) 
 
0.9022 
(-0.0027, -0.30%) 
 
0.9081 
(0.0031, 0.34%) 
 
0.9362 
(0.0313, 3.46%) 
 
 
The second column of Table 11 presents the estimated change related to a 25 percent 
increase in the pay standard. This change in the pay standard has a significant effect on 
TANF and FSP participation (it increases the probability of TANF and FSP participation 
by 9 and 8 percent respectively, as indicated in the parentheses) and a small effect on 
labor participation (it decreases the probability of labor force participation by 1 percent). 
The third column of Table 11 presents the results of a $100 increase in the income 
disregard. This change in the pay standard has a larger effect on TANF participation (it 
increases the probability of TANF participation by 3 percent) and smaller effects on FSP 
and labor participation (is decreases the probability of FSP and labor force participation 
by 1 and 0.30 percent respectively). As in the previous studies, we found that an increase 
in the TANF benefit reduction rate has a larger effect on TANF and FSP participation (it 
decreases the participation in both programs) and a very small effect on labor force 
participation. 
The results of the simulations imply that participation in TANF and the FSP among 
households with low assets who are potentially eligible for TANF is sensitive to changes 
in program parameters. Although labor participation is affected by a change in program 
parameters to some degree, it is most affected (positively) by the (predicted) wage. 
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Conclusions 
This study explores the effects of household- and state-specific characteristics on 
labor force, TANF, and FSP participation choices. The knowledge and information 
gained from this study may provide policy makers with insights on the effects of these 
interventions for individuals and families attempting to achieve financial independence 
and self-sufficiency. This study also provides information on economic, programmatic, 
and non-programmatic factors that affect the well-being of low-income individuals and 
families, which could lead to better program design. Participation in welfare programs 
differs across the eligible households. Our analysis of the data shows that 13 percent of 
the asset-eligible households participate in the FSP, and only 9 percent participate in the 
TANF program.  
The factors that determine FSP and TANF participation are education, family 
structure, and benefits, as well as labor market conditions. The most important and 
significant characteristics for work effort are (predicted) wage (positive effect) and 
number and age of children (negative effect). The findings of the model of joint TANF, 
FSP, and labor force participation are consistent with the findings in the existing 
literature. If the family heads are male or married, then the probability that the household 
participates in TANF or the FSP is significantly lower, and the probability that the 
household head works is significantly higher. Households with children are less likely to 
be in the labor force. 
We found lower program participation for married families; a negative relation 
between welfare participation and labor supply, and a positive relation between the cash 
transfer program and food stamps. Decreases in cash transfers reduce welfare 
participation and encourage labor efforts. Our results show that the welfare program 
parameters affect TANF participation. The results imply that, among households with 
low assets who are potentially eligible for TANF, participation in the TANF and FSP 
programs is sensitive to changes in program parameters. Although labor participation is 
affected by change in program parameters to some degree, it is most affected (positively) 
by the (predicted) wage.
  
Endnotes 
1. For a detailed discussion of the exemptions from time limits, see Gallagher et al. 
1998, p. IV-1. 
 
2. We estimated the structural equation of the probability of TANF participation with 
children less than 6 years of age, but the coefficient was not statistically significant 
and we excluded it from the reported results.
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